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Abstract 
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The  paper  starts  from  Pinker’s  theory  of  the  acquisition  of  phrase  structure;  it 
shows  that it is possible  to drop  all the assumptions  about  innate  syntactic  structure 
from  this  theory.  These  assumptions  can  be  replaced  by  assumptions  about  the 
basic  structure  of  semantic  representation  available  at  the  outset  of  language 
acquisition,  without  penalizing  the  acquisition  of  basic  phrase  structure  rules. 
Essentially,  the  role  played  by  X-bar  theory  in  Pinker’s  model  would  be played  by 
the  (presumably  innate)  structure  of  the  language  of  thought  in  the  revised  parallel 
model.  Bootstrapping  and  semantic  assimilation  theories  are  shown  to be formally 
very  similar,.  though  making  different  primitive  assumptions.  In  their  primitives, 
semantic  assimilation  theories  have  the advantage  that they  can  offer  an  account  of 
the  origin  of  syntactic  categories  instead  of  postulating  them  as primitive.  Ways of 
improving  on  the  semantic  assimilation  version  of  Pinker’s  theory  are  considered, 
including  a  way of  deriving  the  NP-VP  constituent  division  that appears  to have  a 
better  fit  than  Pinker’s  to  evidence  on  language  variation. 
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Introduction 
There  is  a  long-standing  conflict  between  theoretical  approaches  to  language 
acquisition  that  assume  that  the  child  has  innate  syntactic  knowledge,  and 
approaches  that  assume  that  all primitives  are  semantic  or  cognitive.  I shall  refer 
to  these,  respectively,  as  syntactic  and  semantic  approaches  and  theories.  The 
initial  goal  of  the  paper  is to  demonstrate  that  both  approaches  can  give  accounts 
of  the  acquisition  of  phrase  structure  that  are  really  quite  similar.  The  best- 
developed  current  theory  is a  syntactic  theory  -  that  of  Pinker  (1984).  I  investi- 
gate  whether  it  is possible  to  reformulate  this  theory,  dropping  its  innate-syntax 
assumptions  and  replacing  them  with  cognitive  primitives.  Such  a  reformulation 
constructs  a  semantic  theory  that  is  a  twin  of  Pinker’s  syntactic  theory.  The 
second  goal  of  the  paper  is to  show  that  the  reformulation  yields  large  theoretical 
benefits.  Finally,  I consider  how  one  might  improve  on  the  reformulated  theory. 
The  syntactic  position  is  that  a  substantial  set  of  syntactic  categories  and 
relations  is innate.  Thus,  the  child  does  not  “acquire”  syntactic  categories;  rather, 
he  or  she  discovers  instances  of  syntactic  categories  that  they  already  possess  in 
the  input,  and  the  first  rules  they  acquire  refer  to  these  categories.  This  position 
has  long  been  urged  by  Chomsky  (e.g.,  Chomsky,  1965).  and  has  since  been 
advocated  by  many  linguists;  Pinker  (1984)  develops  it  in considerable  detail.  In 
contrast,  according  to  the  semantic  approach,  there  are  no  innate  syntactic 
categories;  the  child  initially  acquires  rules  that  map  elements  of  a  semantic 
representation  into  positions  in  the  surface  structure  (e.g.,  Braine,  1976,  1988a; 
Schlesinger,  1971,  1982,  1988). 
A  problem  that  has  been  alleged  against  the  semantic  approach  is  that, 
apparently,  it  must  postulate  a  mysterious  transition  from  the  early  semantically 
based  system  to  the  adult  syntactically  based  system  -  how  does  the  semantic 
tadpole  become  a  syntactic  frog  (to  use  Gleitman’s  metaphor)?  The  semantic 
position  is that  the  early  semantic  categories  develop  or  “grow”  into  the  syntactic 
ones,  without  any  abrupt  transitions  (e.g.,  Braine,  1988a;  Schlesinger,  1982). 
However,  the  only  available  explanation  of  how  this  growth  takes  place  is 
Schlesinger’s  proposal  of  “semantic  assimilation”  (Schlesinger,  1982,  1988),  and 
his  account  is  suggestive  rather  than  precise.  For  example,  Schlesinger  (1982) 
assumes  that  at some  early  point  children  have  an  agent-action  sentence  schema; 
he  proposes  that  this  schema  is  used  to  analyze  novel  NP-VP  sequences  even 
though  these  may  not  strictly  be  agent-action  ones,  for  example  sentences  with 
experiential  verbs.  Thus,  seeing  often  involves  looking  and  thus  the  subject  of see 
often  has  an  agentive  quality;  similarly,  learning  and  remembering  are  often 
effortful  and  then  their  subjects  resemble  agents.  As  the  agent-action  schema  is 
used  to  parse  sentences  with  these  verbs,  the  agent  and  action  categories 
progressively  expand  beyond  their  original  semantic  nucleus:  actions  come  to 
include  experiences  and  agents  to  include  experiencers.  Schlesinger  refers  to  this 
broadly  extended  agent  category  as a  “generalized  agent,”  and  the  idea  is that  as Innate  structure  for  syntax  79 
it  assimilates  the  subjects  of  intransitive  verbs  and  stative  verbs  as  well  as 
experiential  ones,  it  transmutes  into  subject. 
Schlesinger’s  proposal  has  not  been  developed  with  the  precision  and  detail  that 
is  characteristic  of  Pinker’s  theory.  Nevertheless,  it  is important  to  note  that  its 
essential  learning  principle  embodies  the  idea  that  already-acquired  rules  or 
patterns  are  used  to  analyze  new  input  (e.g.,  as  happens  when  the  known 
agent-action  pattern  is  used  to  parse  sentences  with  experiential  verbs).  I  shall 
call  this  principle  the  old-rules-analyze-new-material  principle.  It  turns  out  to  be 
an  essential  component  of  Pinker’s  learning  mechanism. 
Obviously,  the  syntactic  approach  does  not  give  rise  to  any  special  transition 
problem  -  the  syntactic  position  has  that advantage.  However,  it  faces  two  other 
strategic  problems  that  the  semantic  position  does  not  have  -  the  problem  of  the 
origin  of  syntactic  categories,  and  the  problem  of  how  the  child  could  initially 
identify  instances  of  them  in  the  input.  I  consider  the  first  of  these  briefly,  and 
then  examine  in  detail  Pinker’s  (1984)  “bootstrapping”  solution  to  the  second. 
The  problem  of  the  origin  of  syntactic  categories 
Within  the  syntactic  theory  there  is clearly  a difficult  scientific  problem  about  the 
origin  of  syntactic  categories:  how  do  we  get  from  genes  laid  down  at  conception 
to  syntactic  categories  manifest  two-and-a-half  to  three  years  later?  Merely 
labeling  the  categories  as  innate  does  not  solve  this  problem;  it  just  passes  the 
problem  to  biology  without  considering  how  the  biologist  could  ever  solve  it.  The 
total  explanatory  theory  of  language  acquisition  must  eventually  include  a  de- 
velopmental  theory  of  the  origin  of  whatever  innate  primitives  are  postulated. 
Thus,  if  syntactic  categories  are  innate,  then  a  developmental  account  must  be 
constructed  that  will  provide  a  causal  theory  which  bridges  the  gap  between  the 
genes  and  these  innate  categories.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  syntactic  approach  is 
over  a  quarter  of  a  century  old,  there  have  been  no  proposals-not  even  any 
serious  discussion  -  on  how  this  formidable  task  might  be  accomplished.  (Obvi- 
ously,  one  cannot  leave  this problem  entirely  to  the  biologist  -  most  biologists 
hardly  know  what  syntax  is.)  While  it  is certainly  not  now  reasonable  to  demand 
anything  like  a complete  theory,  it is reasonable  to  expect  a promissory  note,  and 
at  least  a  sketch  of  an  argument  as to  how  it  might  eventually  be  redeemed. 
This  lack  of  an  account  of  the  origin  of  syntactic  categories  is  a  problem 
peculiar  to  the  syntactic  theory.  A successful  semantic  theory  does  account  for  the 
origin  of  syntactic  categories  -  it  would  show  how  and  why  they  emerge  out  of 
semantic  categories  during  development.  Indeed,  a semantic  theory  is a theory  of 
the  origin  of  syntactic  categories.  Of  course,  within  a  semantic  theory  some 
biological  basis  for  semantic  categories  is  needed,  but  that  is  needed  under  all 
theoretical  positions,  including  the  syntactic  position.  To  require  of biology  that  it 
account  for  syntactic  categories  is to  give  it  an  additional  major  burden. 80  M. D.S.  Braine 
Let  us  pause  and  consider  what  is  needed  from  biology  (or  bioneuro- 
psychology)  for  semantic  categories.  I  suggest  the  following: 
(a)  An  architecture  for  an  initial  learning  mechanism  for  concepts  and  rela- 
tions. 
(b)  An  account  of  the  kinds  of  input  delivered  by  sensory  systems  to  the 
learning  mechanism.  As  we  know  from  the  tradition  of  work  started  by  Gibson 
(e.g.,  1966),  these  can  be  complicated,  abstract.  relational,  and  tuned  to  the 
ecology  of  the  organism. 
(c)  Certain  Kantian-type  framework  categories.  Kant,  it  will  be  remembered. 
argued  that  certain  categories.  like  time  and  space,  were  “forms  of  thought”  - 
these  provided  a  framework  for  our  thinking  about  events  which  we  could  not 
avoid  because  the  framework  was  built  into  our  thinking  processes.  It  seems  to 
me  that  a  number  of  such  framework  categories  may  be  crucial  to  the  acquisition 
of  language.  Ontological  categories  are  a  prime  candidate:  for  instance,  the  way 
in  which  one  makes  reference  to  an  entity  characteristically  depends  on  what  kind 
of  entity  it  is;  for  example,  on  whether  it  is  an  object.  place.  time.  event, 
proposition,  etc.  (Jackendoff,  1983,  1989,  1990).  Two  other  framework  categories 
are  “predicate”  and  “argument”.  The  term  “predicate”  comprises  concepts 
(including  p ro  er  ies  and  relations;  the  term  “argument”  refers  to  instances  of  p  t’  ) 
concepts  or  entities  related  by  relations.  That  is,  a  relation  is  a  predicate  with  two 
or  more  arguments,  the  entities  related  being  the  arguments;  a  concept  is  a 
predicate  with  just  one  argument,  and  to  predicate  a  concept  or  property  of  an 
object  (argument)  is  merely  to  say  of  the  object  that  it  is  an  instance  of  the 
concept,  or  that  it  has  the  property.  There  is  good  reason  to  think  that  the 
predicate-argument  distinction  must  be  cognitively  primitive.  Thus,  theories  of 
concept  formation  in  the  psychological  literature  have  all  taken  the  distinction 
between  a  concept  and  its  instances  for  granted  as  already  available  to  subjects, 
and  just  seek  to  account  for  the  acquisition  of  specific  concepts;  no  one  has 
thought  that  the  distinction  itself  might  have  to  be  learned.  The  distinction  is 
likewise  taken  as  primitive  in  logic  and  semantics:  there  is  no  way  of  deriving  the 
distinction  from  more  primitive  logical  notions,  and  there  is  no  known  way  of 
doing  semantics  without  it.  I  have  argued  for  the  fundamental  nature  of  these 
categories  elsewhere  (Braine,  1988a),  and  have  also  shown  how  they  could  be 
crucial  in  the  acquisition  of  word  classes  (Braine.  1987).  If  one  accepts  Fodor’s 
(1975)  arguments  for  a  “language  of  thought.”  then  predicate  and  argument 
would  be  syntactic  categories  of  the  language  of  thought,  aspects  of  an  innate 
format  for  recording  information.  Thus,  the  child’s  comprehension  mechanism 
would  have  the  distinction  primitively  available  both  in  understanding  input 
sentences  and  in  encoding  events  perceived,  and  we  may  assume  that  the  child 
spontaneously  encodes  events  and  scenes  as  presenting  objects  that  have  prop- 
erties  and  are  related  to  other  objects;  for  example,  for  a  child  to  perceive  an Innate  structure  for  syntax  81 
event  of  a  dog  biting  a  cat  would  be  to  perceive  an  action  relation  (biting) 
between  a  dog  (object,  argument)  and  a  cat  (object,  argument). 
It  is quite  possible  -  indeed  very  likely  -  that  there  are  other  categories  of  the 
language  of  thought,  beyond  ontological  categories  and  predicate/argument,  that 
are  relevant  to  language  acquisition.  If  the  line  of  thought  I  develop  later  is 
correct,  then,  inevitably,  any  syntactic  category  of  the  language  of  thought  would 
be  a semantic  category  of  ordinary  language  that  is relevant  to  syntax  acquisition. 
I  have  singled  out  the  framework  categories  for  special  mention  under  (c)  above 
because  they  seem  especially  relevant  to  language  acquisition.  I  do  not  mean  to 
imply  that  they  are  separate  from  (a)  and  (b) -  some  may  well  be  the  product  of 
the  structure  of  sensory  systems,  and  the  others  determined  by  the  architecture  of 
the  learning  mechanism  of  (a).  Note  that  there  is  nothing  that  is  seriously 
problematic  in  this  list  of  what  is  needed  to  account  for  innate  semantic 
categories.  Under  (a),  the  architecture  of  an initial  learning  mechanism  has  both  a 
functional  and  a physiological  aspect:  the  specification  of  the  functional  architec- 
ture  is  a  task  for  psychology,  and  discovering  its  physiological  realization  falls 
squarely  within  neurophysiology.  Item  (b)  is a recognized  scientific  topic  that  has 
been  actively  under  investigation  for  generations  by  sensory  neurophysiologists 
and  students  of  perception.  The  framework  categories  under  (c)  presumably 
reflect  either  learning  mechanism  architecture  or  the  structure  of  sensory  systems. 
Thus,  no  potentially  insoluble  problems  have  been  passed  to  biology. 
Is  bootstrapping  necessary? 
Let  us  now  return  to  the  problems  of  the  syntactic  position,  and  in  particular  to 
the  second  problem  whose  existence  I  mentioned  earlier.  This  is  that  innate 
syntactic  categories  are  not  of  any  use  to  a learner  unless  he or  she  has  a means  of 
recognizing  instances  of  them  in  the  input.  Innate  NPs,  Ns,  VPs,  etc.,  are  of  use 
only  if  the  child  knows  how  to  identify  NPs,  Ns,  VPs,  etc.,  in  parental  speech. 
The  famous  “bootstrapping”  notion,  suggested  originally  by  Grimshaw  (1981), 
and  developed  in  detail  by  Pinker  (1984),  is  proposed  to  solve  this  problem. 
According  to  the  bootstrapping  proposal,  the  child  not  only  has  innate  syntactic 
categories,  but  also  has  innate  semantic  flags  for  them.  Thus,  there  is an  innate 
default  assignment  of  words  for  objects  to  the  noun  class,  of  actions  and  changes 
of  state  to  the  verb  class,  of  agents  to  subject,  etc.  These  assignments  enable  the 
child  to  recognize  instances  of  the  syntactic  categories  in the  input  before  having 
acquired  any  syntactic  rules  of  the  target  language. 
Although  the  child  does  not  know  syntactic  rules  at  the  stage  considered  (i.e., 
just  prior  to  syntax  acquisition),  he  or  she  is assumed  to  have  some  vocabulary 82  M. D.S.  Braine 
knowledge  and  to  be  able  to  distinguish  the  words  in  simple  spoken  sentences. 
Pinker  provides  rather  little  discussion  of  this  point  (cf.  Pinker,  1982,  pp. 
689-690;  1984,  pp.  29-30;  1989,  pp.  361-363),  but  he  clearly  assumes  at  least 
some  vocabulary  of concrete  nouns  (dog,  cat,  etc.)  and  possibly  some  other  words 
or  short  phrases  (e.g.,  sleep,  go  to  bed,  perhaps  bit  in the  example  below).  This 
vocabulary  knowledge  permits  some  matching  of elements  of  the  spoken  sentence 
with  elements  of  the  event  representation.  For  instance,  given  the  spoken 
sentence  The  dog  bit the cat,  knowledge  of  the  words  dog  and  cat guarantees  that 
these  words,  rather  than  the  and  bit,  will  be  matched  to  “dog”  and  “cat”  in  the 
event  representation.  It  is also  assumed  that  parents  prefer  to  use  words  whose 
meanings  they  think  their  child  knows,  and  that  there  is  enough  similarity 
between  children  and  adults’  cognitive  and  perceptual  mechanisms  that  both  tend 
to  encode  similarly  the  events  that  adults  talk  to  children  about.  The  assumption 
is  widely  shared  that  children  can  often  infer  the  semantic  representation  of 
parental  utterances  from  context  and  vocabulary  knowledge,  and  that  they  can  do 
so  often  enough  to  get  syntax  acquisition  started  (e.g.,  Anderson,  1983;  Braine, 
1988a;  Macnamara,  1972,  1982;  Schlesinger.  1982;  Wexler  &  Culicover,  1980).’ 
(Of  course,  if the  child  fails to  achieve  a semantic  representation  for  an utterance, 
then,  for  Pinker’s  model  as for  several  others,  there  is simply  no  input.) 
In  Pinker’s  (1984)  acquisition  theory  there  are  two  learning  phases.  In  Phase  1, 
the  child  uses  the  innate  semantic  flags to  parse  some  sentences  and  acquire  some 
rules.  For  example,  given  the  input  sentence  The  dog  bit the cat, with  appropriate 
context,  the  semantic  flags  lead  the  child  to  classify  cat and  dog  as Ns,  and  bit as 
V,  they  also  cause  the  child  to  know  that  the  dog,  being  agent,  must  be  subject. 
This  means  that  the  child  can  construct  the  tree  shown  in  Figure  1. 
Given  this  tree,  the  child  acquires  the  following  rules  by  reading  them  off  the 
tree: 
S*  NPsUbj  + VP 
VP-V  + NPobj 
NP+  Det  + N 
‘Recently.  a  theory  known  as  “syntactic  bootstrapping”  (as  contrasted  with  Pinker’s  “semantic 
bootstrapping”)  has  been  advanced,  with  considerable  empirical  support,  to  explain  acquisition  of  the 
aigument  structure  and  much  of  the  meaning  of  many  verbs  -  the  child  infers  components  of  verb 
meaning  from  a  verb’s  observed  subcategorization  frame  (e.g..  Gleitman.  1990).  The  theory  is 
sometimes  discussed  as  if  it  were  competitive  with  Pinker’s  “semantic”  bootstrapping.  However,  it 
clearly  cannot  be,  even  if  only  because  Gleitman’s  syntactic  bootstrapping  presupposes  some  prior 
knowledge  of  basic  phrase  structure  in  order  to  identify  the  parts  (subject.  object  (or  agent.  patient), 
etc.)  of  subcategorization  frames  (e.g..  the  subcategorization  frames  of  English  and  Turkish  present 
very  different  surface  forms  for  verbs  with  the  same  semantic  structure).  Thus,  despite  the  similar 
terminology,  the  theories  do  not  deal  with  the  same  phenomena.  Syntactic  bootstrapping  presupposes 
some  mechanism  other  than  itself  (like  Pinker’s  theory  or  some  replacement)  for  the  acquisition  of 
phrase  structure. Innate  sfructure  for  syntax  83 
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Figure  1.  Parse-tree  (somewhat  simplified)  that a child  could  construct.  according  to  Pinker’s  (1984) 
theory.  given  the  sentence,  the  appropriate  scene,  and  pre-existing  vocabulary  knowledge. 
I  simplify  a  little  over  Pinker’s  presentation:  Pinker  has  a  somewhat  more 
complicated  tree  and  five  rules  rather  than  three,  together  with  some  lexical 
entries  which  I  omit  for  now  (Pinker,  1984,  pp.  70-72).  Pinker  concludes  from 
the  example  that  on  the  basis  of  the  single  input  event  “The  child  has  . . . induced 
five  phrase  structure  rules  complete  with  functional  annotations  and  lexical  entries 
for  each  word”  (Pinker,  1984,  p.  72).  (I  pass  over,  for  now,  the  imputation  of 
one-trial  learning.) 
Once  the  rules  have  been  learned  in Phase  1 by the  procedure  illustrated  above, 
they  are  available  in  Phase  2 to  analyze  input  sentences  where  semantic  flags  to 
syntactic  categorization  are  absent.  (Phase  2  is  not  a  rigid  point  in  time,  but 
begins  as  soon  as  there  are  rules  available.)  Pinker’s  example  input  sentence  to 
illustrate  what  happens  in  Phase  2  is  The  situation  justified  the  measures.  The 
learning  principle  that  is operative  in  Phase  2 is that  old  rules  are  used  to  parse 
new  input  (Pinker,  1984,  Procedure  Pl,  p.  67,  taken  with  Procedure  Ll,  p.  68, 
which  creates  new  lexical  entries  according  to  the  parsing).  Thus,  the  rule 
NP-,  Det  + N  causes  both  situation  and  measures  to  be  classified  as  N;  these 
words  are  then  marked  as  nouns  in  the  burgeoning  lexicon.  The  same  rule 
identifies  the  phrases  the  situation  and  the  measures  as  NPs.  The  existing  rules 
then  allow  the  entire  tree  to  be  built,  identifying  the  situation  as  subject  and 
justified  as  verb. 
What  is interesting  here  -  particularly  noteworthy,  I believe  -  is that  the  same 
principle,  the  old-rules-analyze-new-material  principle,  is used  in  both  theories, 
that  is, both  Schlesinger’s  semantic  assimilation  theory  and  Pinker’s  bootstrapping 
theory.  And  in  both  theories  it  does  essentially  the  same  job:  it  causes  new 
material  to  be  assimilated  into  a  pre-existing  category,  and  as  this  happens  the 
extension  of  the  pre-existing  category  expands  beyond  its  original  semantic 
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Given  this  similarity  between  semantic  assimilation  and  bootstrapping  theories, 
let  us  ask  a  further  question  about  Pinker’s  theory.  What  is  doing  the  major 
learning  work  in  his  theory?  The  theory  embodies  two  main  ideas:  the  innate- 
syntax-with-semantic-flags  notion,  and  the  old-rules-analyze-new-material  prin- 
ciple.  Are  both  of  these  equally  essential?  It  is clear  that  the  old-analyzes-new 
principle  is essential,  because  the  semantic  flags  cannot  work  without  it.  But  are 
the  innate  syntactic  categories  with  their  semantic  flags  necessary?  One  good  way 
to  answer  this  is  to  try  to  suppress  the  innateness  claims,  while  keeping  the 
old-analyzes-new  principle  and  altering  the  rest  of  the  theory  as little  as possible, 
and  see  if we  can  obtain  a  system  that  still  learns. 
In  what  follows,  I carry  out  my  analysis  of  Pinker’s  theory  in two  steps.  At  the 
first  step,  I drop  only  the  assumption  that  “object”  innately  flags  N,  and  keep  all 
Pinker’s  other  innate-syntax  assumptions.  At  the  second  step,  I drop  these  other 
assumptions. 
Let  us  look  again  at  our  sample  input  sentence-event  pair  at  Phase  1: The  dog 
bit the cut.  On  Pinker’s  assumptions  the  child  constructed  the  tree  of Figure  1. Let 
us  begin  by  dropping  just  the  one  assumption  that  “object”  flags  N -  let  us  say 
that  objects  like  cats  and  dogs  are  categorized  by  the  child  as objects,  and  words 
that  refer  to  objects  as “object-words.”  Then  our  tree  becomes  the  one  shown  in 
Figure  2. 
In  this  figure  I  attach  “?”  to  the  branches  connecting  the  nodes  NP  and 
object-word,  because  there  is a legitimate  objection  that  substituting  object-word 
for  N should  disrupt  this connection.  I ignore  this objection  for  this paragraph  and 
then  return  to  it.  Given  the  tree  in  Figure  2,  the  child  can  read  off  the  rules: 
S-,  NP,,,,  + VP 
VP-V  + NPobj 
NP+  Det  + object-word’ 
Now  what  happens  at  Phase  2 when  the  old-analyzes-new  principle  applies?  Let 
us take  Pinker’s  example  again:  The situation  justified  the measures.  We apply  the 
rule  NP+= Det  + object-word,’  instead  of  the  previous  NP+  Det  + N,  and  what 
happens  is that  situation  and  measures  are  both  classified  as object-words  just  as 
before  they  were  classified  as  N.  That  is.  situation,  measures,  and  other  non- 
object-words  are  classified  in the  same  class  as cat,  dog,  and  other  object-words, 
‘In connection  with  all  the  figures,  one  might  raise  the  question  how  the  child  knows  that  the 
should  be  classified  as  determiner.  (Pinker.  1984.  p.  69.  refers  the  reader  to  his  chapter  on  inflection  at 
this  point.)  I have  chosen  to  stay  as  close  to  Pinker’s  analyses  in  form  as  possible.  but.  in  fact,  nothing 
theoretically  important  for  this  paper  turns  on  the  child  initially  putting  a  determiner  node  between  the 
and  NP.  The  main  arguments  would  go  through  if  this  node  were  eliminated  and  the  NP-rule  were 
simply  NP-  rhe  +  object.  Elsewhere  (Braine,  1987).  I  discuss  in  some  detail  how  a  child  learner 
might  perceive  the  internal  structure  of  NPs. Innate  structure  for  syntax  85 
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The  dog  bit  the  cat 
Figure  2.  Parse-tree  given  the assumptions  of  Figure  I  with the change  that the  child  categorizes  words 
for  objects  only  as  object-words.  not  as  Ns. 
because  of  their  occurrence  following  determiners  in  the  same  phrase  -  that 
means  that  they  are  classified  in a class  that  has  the  same  extension  as Pinker’s  N. 
Note  that,  given  the  identity  of  membership,  it does  not  matter  how  we -  linguists 
and  psycholinguists  -  label  the  class.  It  follows  that  as the  child’s  input  comes  to 
include  non-object-words  in  N-positions  as  well  as  object-words,  the  child’s 
object-word  class  “grows”  into  the  N-class,  just  as  semantic  theorists  claim 
happens.  Thus,  it  looks  as  if  the  innate  flag  may  be  redundant. 
However,  as  noted  earlier,  one  can  properly  ask:  what  justifies  attaching  the 
node  object-word  under  NP,  once  we substitute  object-word  for  N in Figure  2? In 
Pinker’s  theory,  N is attached  under  NP  because  all X-bar  theory  is assumed  to be 
innately  known  to  the  child:  in X-bar  theory,  any  word  class  X  (X = N,  V, A,  or 
P)  is  inherently  attached  under  its  phrase-class  XP.  (Of  course,  in  X-bar  theory 
there  is a  hierarchy  of  nodes,  X,  X’, X”, and  in most  versions  X”’ also,  where  X’, 
X”,  X”’ are  phrasal.  Pinker  assumes  three  levels-X,  X’,  X”;  I  have  further 
simplified  by  only  considering  two -  N,  NP,  V, VP -  in the  above  examples.)  But, 
obviously,  X-bar  theory  would  not  allow  us to  attach  object-word  under  NP.  Also, 
in  any  case,  the  present  goal  is to  investigate  the  possibility  of  dropping  strong 
assumptions  of  innateness  of  syntax,  such  as the  assumption  that  all X-bar  theory 
is innately  known.  So  I shall  now  proceed  to  my second  step  in analyzing  Pinker’s 
theory  and  try  to  drop  this  assumption. 
It  turns  out,  fortunately,  that  there  is a  good  semantic  rationale  for  attaching 
object-word  into  a  tree  structure  that  is similar  in form  to  Figure  2.  In  the  input 
sentence  The  dog  bit  the  cat,  the  dog  and  the  cat are  arguments  of  the  predicate 
bit.  This  fact  is  clearly  recorded  in  the  f-structure  that  Pinker  assumes  for  this 
sentence  (Pinker,  1984,  p.  69).  (In  the  parlance  of  lexical-functional  grammar 
(LFG),  f-structure  refers  to  aspects  of  semantic  structure  that  may  obtain 86  M. D.S.  Braine 
syntactic  expression.  Pinker  assumes  that  the  child  is  able  to  deduce  the  f- 
structure  from  the  situational  context  sufficiently  often,  and  that  the  child  begins 
learning  syntax  from  sentences  whose  f-structure  has  been  worked  out  from 
context.)  The  f-structure  also  marks  the  dog  as  the  agent  argument.  In  addition, 
the  dog  and  the  cat  are  not  just  arguments  -  they  are  arguments  of  a  particular 
kind,  namely  object  arguments  (unlike  arguments  like  in  the garage,  in  George put 
the  car  in  the  garage,  which  are  place  arguments  -  see  Jackendoff,  1983,  Chs.  3 
and  4). 
In  connection  with  Figure  2  we  assume  that  the  child  classifies  words  that 
indicate  object  kinds  as  object-words;  let  us  now  extend  this  assumption  to  posit 
that  the  child  initially  classifies  words  and  phrases  according  to  the  ontological 
category  of  the  entity  they  refer  to.  Depending  on  the  assumptions  made  about 
semantic  structure  and  trees.  the  semantic  structure  described  for  this  sentence 
would  allow  various  trees  to  be  constructed  for  the  sentence.  One  such  tree,  with 
a  simple  branching  structure  that  makes  minimal  assumptions,  is  shown  in  Figure 
3.  From  this  tree  a  child  could  acquire  the  following  rules  by  reading  them  off  the 
tree: 
S+  object-argument-P,,,,,  +  predicate  +  object-argument-P 
object-argument-P+  Det  +  object-word 
Another  tree  is  possible  if  we  follow  the  assumption  of  Pinker’s  theory  that 
agent  arguments  are  specially  privileged  tree-structurally  in  having  a  major  branch 
allotted  to  them.  Because  the  dog  is  marked  as  agent  in  the  f-structure,  that 
assumption  would  lead  to  a  tree  like  the  one  shown  in  Figure  4.  One  may  note 
S 
tig”m*“t_p  Object-Argument-F&,t  Predicate 
(Det)  ObJect-word  (Det)  Object-word 
I  I  I  I 
The  dog  blt  the  cat 
Figure  3.  Parse-tree  that mighf  be  constructed  by  a child  caregorizing  words  and  phrases  according  IO 
ontological  category  and  predicatelargument  status Innare  smcrure  for  syntax  X7 
Figure  4.  An  alternative  parse-tree  10 Figure  3.  which  privileges  agents 
that  the  tree  of  Figure  4  differs  from  that  of  Figure  1 only  in  the  fact  that  the 
nodes  have  semantic  rather  than  syntactic  labels.  I use  the  term  “action  phrase” 
for  the  node  that  is complementary  to  the  agent-argument  node.  From  this  tree 
the  child  could  read  off  the  rules: 
S --;, object-argument-P,,,,,  + action-P 
action-P+  predicate  + object-argument-P 
object-argument-P+  Det  + object-word 
Now  let  us  see  what  happens  when  we  take  the  rules  learned  in  Phase  1 and 
apply  them,  in  Phase  2.  to  Pinker’s  next  sentence  The  situation  justified  the 
measures,  under  the  principle  that  old  rules  analyze  new  material.  Assuming  the 
configuration’  of  Figure  4 and  Pinker’s  learning  procedures  (as before,  Procedures 
Pl  and  Ll  (Pinker,  1984,  pp.  67-68)),  the  rules  force  the  assignment  of  the  tree 
structure  shown  in Figure  5.  This  causes  situation  and  measures  to  be  categorized 
as  object-words,  and  the  situation  and  the  measures  as  object-argument-phrases. 
Note  that  if we  had  assumed  the  tree  structure  of  Figure  3 instead  of  Figure  4 we 
would  still  have  found  that  situation  and  measures  were  categorized  as  object- 
words,  and  the  situation  and  the  measures  as  object-argument-phrases.  That 
happens  regardless  of  which  tree  is assumed.  Thus,  assuming  that  the  child  has 
experience  with  a range  of  English  sentences  and  given  the  principle  that  old  rules 
analyze  new  material,  it  is  apparent  that  object-argument-Ps  will  eventually 
become  co-extensive  with  NPs  and  the  object-word  category  with  N. 
If  we  are  willing  to  make  the  assumption  about  the  tree-structure  privilege  of 
agents  that  motivates  the  configuration  of  Figure  4,  we  obtain  an  interesting 
result.  Because  of  the  match  between  Figure  4 and  Figure  1,  we  can  envisage  a 88  M. D.S.  Braine 
Object-Ahment-P 
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Object-word 
I  I  (Det)  Object-word 
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Figure  5.  Parse-free  for  The  situation  justified  the  measures.  thar a child  might  construct  affer  having 
learned  the  rules  derivable  from  Figure  4. 
theory  that  matches  Pinker’s,  except  for  the  dropped  innateness-of-syntax  as- 
sumptions.  Given  a child  that  encounters  the  same  set  of  sentences  that  Pinker’s 
child  encounters,  that  child  is bound  to  acquire  categories  that  are  co-extensive 
with  the  categories  that  Pinker’s  child  acquires  at  every  stage  of  the  learning; 
moreover,  the  categories  would  appear  in  phrase  structure  rules  isomorphic  to 
Pinker’s.  The  same  syntax  would  be  acquired  by  the  two  model  children.  As 
noted  earlier,  given  the  identity  of extension,  it does  not  matter  what  linguists  and 
psycholinguists  call  the  categories.  It  follows  that  it  is  possible  to  drop  the 
innateness-of-syntax  assumptions  of  Pinker’s  that  we  have  considered;  and  then, 
with  suitable  assumptions  about  the  structure  of  the  child’s  semantic  representa- 
tions,  we  can  obtain  a semantic  assimilation  theory  that  learns  phrase  structure  as 
well  as  Pinker’s  theory  does,  and  indeed  in  essentially  the  same  way  that  his 
theory  does. 
However,  the  assumption  of  Pinker’s  that  justifies  Figures  1  and  4 -the 
tree-structure  privilege  of  agents  -  is problematic  because  of  the  nature  of  some 
ergative  languages.  As  Pinker  himself  points  out  (1987,  p.  413),  if  the  child 
innately  assumed  that  agents  are  tree-structurally  privileged,  it  would  make 
languages  where  subject  is not  correlated  with  agent  inherently  very  difficult  for  a 
child  to  learn-see  Braine  (1988b)  for  further  discussion  and  Pye  (1990)  for 
detailed  treatment  together  with  some  developmental  evidence  on  morphological- 
ly  ergative  languages.  For  the  special  acquisition  problems  associated  with  the 
typically  split  nature  of  ergative  systems,  see  Van  Valin  (1992).  These  problems 
are,  of  course,  as  much  problems  for  Pinker’s  original  theory  as they  are  for  the 
reformulated  version. 
If  we  adopt  the  configuration  of  Figure  3,  then  we  still  have  a  theory  in which 
initial  semantic  categories  grow  into  later  syntactic  ones.  Moreover,  we will have Innate  .structure  for  sytax  80 
made  no  assumptions  that  would  make  ergative  languages  difficult  to  learn. 
However,  the  rules  acquired  by  a  child  exposed  to  English  will  not  be  the  rules 
usually  assumed  for  English.  In  particular,  they  will  lack  the  major  NP,,,,,,,-VP 
constituent  division  usually  assumed  for  English.  Something  would  have  to  be 
added  to  the  model  for  this  to  be  acquired.  Thus,  neither  Figure  3 alone,  nor  the 
assumption  that  agents  are  tree-structurally  privileged,  provides  an  entirely 
satisfactory  basis  for  learning.  I propose  a  solution  to  this  dilemma  later  in  this 
paper.  In  the  meantime,  one  may  note  that  both  the  models  associated  with 
Figures  3 and  4 acquire  syntax  without  Pinker’s  innate-syntax  assumptions,  one  of 
them  closely  mimicking  his  theory. 
It is important  to  note  that  in order  to obtain  learning  without  the  innate-syntax 
assumptions,  I  have  made  some  strong  assumptions  about  the  structure  of 
semantic  representation  at  the  outset  of  language  development.  For  example,  I 
have  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  child  analyzes  propositions  as  composed  of 
predicates  and  arguments,  and  is  sensitive  to  ontological  category.  In  effect,  I 
have  assumed  that  a basic  organization  of  the  structure  of  propositions  is built  in 
(or,  at  least,  available  at  the  outset  of  syntax  acquisition),  and  that  this  basic 
propositional  structure  is in many  ways  analogous  to  X-bar  theory.  That  is, it has 
a tree  structure  like  X-bar  theory,  and  differs  primarily  in having  semantic  labels 
and  functions  for  nodes,  for  example,  object-argument-phrase  in  place  of  NP. 
Presumably,  this  basic  propositional  structural  framework  reflects  (or,  better,  is 
part  of)  the  structure  of  the  language  of  thought. 
The  assumption  that  there  is  some  basic  similarity  between  the  structure  of 
semantic  representation  and  the  phrase  structure  of  sentences  seems  well  moti- 
vated,  and  it  is  certainly  widely  shared.  Language  presumably  evolved  as  a 
medium  to  express  thoughts;  it is therefore  expectable  that  there  should  be formal 
similarity  between  syntactic  organization  in  the  medium  and  the  structure  of  the 
underlying  thoughts;  one  would  particularly  expect  such  similarity  when  both  the 
thoughts  and  the  language  are  at  their  most  simple,  as  at  early  stages  of 
development.  Formal  parallels  in  the  structure  of  syntactic  and  semantic  repre- 
sentation  are  the  norm  in linguistic  theories.  For  instance,  they  hold  in Montague 
grammar  (e.g.,  Partee,  1976).  The  assumption  of  parallel  structure  is  implicit, 
within  government-binding  (G-B)  theory,  in  the  projection  principle  taken  with 
the  theta-criterion,  which  requires  that  the  argument  structure  of  a lexical  item  be 
manifest  at every  syntactic  level,  including  surface  structure  (e.g.,  Sells,  1985);  the 
assumption  is reinforced  in  recent  work  on  argument  structure  (e.g.,  Grimshaw, 
1990;  Jackendoff,  1990;  Pinker,  1989)  which  declares  it  to  be  a  projection  from 
lexical  semantic/conceptual  structure.  Finally,  Jackendoff  (1990)  speaks  of  “X- 
bar  semantics,”  arguing  for  strong  formal  similarity  between  semantic/conceptual 
representation  and  syntactic  phrase  structure. 
If  the  assumptions  about  the  primitive  structure  of  semantic  representation  are 
correct,  then  syntactic  X-bar  theory  is not  innate.  What  is innate  is a presumably 90  M. D. S.  Braine 
universal  initial  structure  of  the  language  of  thought.  Categories  of  this  language 
of  thought  are  mapped  on  to  positions  in  surface  structure  to  provide  the  child 
with  an  early  set  of  rules  of  sentence  formation.  Then,  as  these  rules  are 
persistently  used  to  analyze  new  material,  the  reflexes  of  the  categories  of  the 
language  of  thought  grow  into  the  syntactic  categories  of  the  language  being 
learned.  Since  the  languages  of  the  world  differ  from  each  other,  the  operation  of 
the  old-analyzes-new  principle  moulds  the  child’s  initial  categories  in  different 
ways  in  different  languages  to  recreate  the  differences  among  adult  languages. 
Nevertheless,  the  syntactic  categories  of  the  different  languages  stay  sufficiently 
close  to  the  initial  semantic  nucleus  that  we  can  recognize  universal  syntactic 
categories,  like  NP  with  its root  in an expression  designating  an  object  argument. 
That  fact  -  the  common  root  in a semantic  category  of  the  language  ‘of thought  - 
accounts  for  the  universality  of  syntactic  categories  that  are  universal.  Indeed, 
research  that  seeks  out  the  semantic  roots  of what  is universal  or  near-universal  in 
phrase  structure  (see  Jackendoff,  1983,  1990,  for  an  example)  would  seem  to  be 
one  of  the  few  available  major  routes  for  throwing  light  on  the  structure  of  the 
language  of  thought. 
Comparison  of  the  primitives  of  “assimilation”  and  “bootstrapping”  theories 
The  preceding  section  has  shown  how  to  construct  a semantic  assimilation  theory 
that  is  formally  quite  similar  to  Pinker’s  bootstrapping  theory.  There  is  such  a 
theory  (i.e.,  the  one  associated  with  Figure  4 above)  that  acquires  rules  that  are 
isomorphic  to  those  of  his theory  and  acquires  them  in essentially  the  same  way. 
An  immediate  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is that  semantic  assimilation  and  semantic 
bootstrapping  theories  are  much  more  similar  to  each  other  than  discussions  in 
the  literature  would  suggest.  It seems  that  the  two  kinds  of  theories  can  be  almost 
notational  variants.  Thus,  in  principle,  there  can  be  no  empirical  evidence  that 
discriminates  between  the  two  classes  of  theories.  However,  despite  the  formal 
similarities  between  bootstrapping  and  semantic  assimilation  theories,  there  is a 
very  significant  difference  in  primitives. 
In  my  reformulation  of  Pinker’s  theory,  the  developmental  primatives  are: 
(1)  a  learning  mechanism  that  uses  the  old-rules-analyze-new-material  principle; 
(2)  semantic  categories  such  as “argument”  and  “predicate,”  including  ontologi- 
cal  categories,  for  example  “object,”  “place,”  “action,”  “event;” 
(3a)  a  tendency  to  classify  words  and  phrases,  not  already  classified  by  (l),  as 
referring  to  instances  of  the  categories  in  (2). 
While  Pinker’s  original  account  shares  (1)  and  (2)  as primitives,  it does  not  have Innate  structure  for  syntax  91 
(3a);  instead,  it  has  (3b)  the  natural  language  syntactic  categories  themselves  (N, 
NP,  V,  VP,  etc.),  as  primitives,  with  each  category  earmarked  (4)  as  having 
particular  semantic  categories  as canonical  members. 
Thus,  Pinker’s  account  posits  that  the  natural  language  syntactic  categories  exist 
from  the  outset  of  language  acquisition  as  innate  categories  having  some  bio- 
logical  or  psychological  reality  separate  from  their  canonical  members.  On  his 
account  the  mental  origin  of  these  syntactic  categories  is left  quite  mysterious  and 
a  theory  of  origins  is needed.  In  contrast,  in  my  reformulation  there  are  initially 
no  natural  language  syntactic  categories,  and  words  referring  to  objects,  predi- 
cates,  and  arguments  do  not  innately  “flag”  other  categories  as they  do  in Pinker’s 
theory.  In  my  version,  syntactic  categories  emerge  under  the  joint  operation  of 
(1)  and  (3a).  Th us,  the  reformulated  theory  provides  an  account  of  the  origin  of 
natural  language  syntactic  categories  instead  of  postulating  them  as  primitives. 
That  is  a  very  significant  theoretical  benefit  of  the  reformulation. 
In  claiming  that  the  reformulated  theory  provides  an  account  of  the  de- 
velopmental  origin  of  syntactic  categories,  I  do  not  mean  that  it  leaves  nothing 
whose  developmental  origin  remains  to  be  explicated.  Rather,  I  mean  that  it 
explains  syntactic  categories  in  terms  of  the  operation  of  primitives  that  are  not 
themselves  syntactic;  that  is,  natural  language  syntax  plays  no  role  in  the 
explanation.  Incidentally,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  speaks  greatly  to  the  value  and 
hidden  resources  of  Pinker’s  theory  that  with  only  a  little  tinkering  it  has  been 
possible  to  formulate  it to  provide  an  account  of the  origin  of  syntactic  categories. 
While  the  reformulated  theory  eliminates  innate  syntactic  structure  as  a neces- 
sary  primitive  for  the  acquisition  of  phrase  structure,  it might  be  argued  that  such 
categories  would  be  needed  for  the  acquisition  of  more  complex  phenomena. 
That  is  possible  but  remains  to  be  seen.  I  shall  not  now  argue  against  the 
possibility,  but  would  note  that  complex  syntax  (e.g.,  control  relations,  long- 
distance  binding)  is acquired  after  basic  phrase  structure  and  thus  at a time  when, 
on  anybody’s  theory,  there  is  in  place  a  substantial  scaffolding  of  syntactic 
categories  and  rules  together  with  syntactically  annotated  lexical  entries.  Within 
the  G-B  framework,  acquisition  would  be  affected  by  principles  (e.g.,  the 
projection  principle,  the  theta-criterion,  subjacency,  the  case  filter)  assumed  to  be 
innate;  to  the  extent  that  such  principles  operate  on  syntactic  categories,  the 
categories  would  themselves  presumably  have  to  be  innate.  However,  it  is  also 
possible  that  relevant  universal  principles  will turn  out  to  be  themselves  rooted  in 
semantic  structure  (like,  it is claimed,  X-bar  theory),  or  to  have  a pragmatic  basis 
(see,  for  example,  the  discussion  of  subjacency  by  Van  Valin,  1991). 
In  sum,  given  the  theoretical  benefit  and  the  greater  economy  of  the  semantic 
assimilation  over  the  bootstrapping  formulation,  the  former  is to  be  preferred.  I 
propose  that,  in  future,  the  term  “bootstrapping”  be  taken  to  include  the 
semantic-assimilation  formulation,  and  that  the  language  that  speaks  of  “flags”  to 
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A  range  of  possible  theories 
While  I  deliberately  sketched  a  theory  that  was  the  same  as  Pinker’s,  except  for 
the  dropped  innate  syntax  assumptions,  I did  so in order  to  make  transparent  the 
close  relation  between  bootstrapping  and  semantic  assimilation  theories,  not  in 
order  to  promote  a particular  theory.  Many  different  theories  would  be  possible 
that  share  the  primitives  and  manner  of  operation  of  the  reformulated  Pinker 
theory  developed  above.  Below  I  mention  two  ways  in  which  I  believe  both 
Pinker’s  theory  and  the  reformulated  theory  could  be  improved,  and  then  discuss 
alternative  semantic  bases  for  two  important  acquisitions. 
First,  an  acquisition  theory  needs  a mechanism  that  allows  for  gradual  learning 
and  for  forgetting.  While  Pinker  proposes  a  strengthening  mechanism  for  rules 
and  features,  he  largely  ignores  it  and  usually  discusses  his theory  as if it posited 
one-trial  learning  (cf.  the  quotation  cited  earlier  from  Pinker,  1984).  As  Pinker 
recognizes  in  principle,  one-trial  learning  is  a  most  implausible  assumption.  In 
Braine  (1988a)  I  propose  a  mechanism  in  which  rules  increase  in  strength  when 
they  are  used  to  parse  an  input  utterance,  and  weaken  with  disuse.  In  reviewing 
Pinker’s  theory  (Braine,  1988b),  I show  how  such  a mechanism  could  be exploited 
to  solve  neatly  several  problems  of  a  kind  that  Pinker’s  theory  labors  over. 
Second,  Pinker’s  model  and  my  sketched  reformulation  both  concentrate 
unduly  on  speech  acts  that  are  assertions  of  declarative  propositions,  which  is 
surely  not  the  most  common  kind  of  speech  act  in verbal  interactions  with  young 
children.  Semantic  analyses  more  appropriate  to  requests  and  other  speech  acts 
need  to  be  incorporated  into  the  model.  Also,  to  accommodate  many  utterances, 
particularly  among  children’s  first  word  combitiations,  a  model  should  allow  for 
the  child  analyzing  and  composing  utterances  that  reflect  parts  of  trees,  that  is, 
subpropositional  constituents  occurring  in  the  context  of  various  kinds  of  speech 
acts.  Such  constituents  represent  a  level  of  complexity  intermediate  between 
single-word  vocabulary  and  multi-word  sentences.  As  noted  earlier,  both  boot- 
strapping  and  semantic  assimilation  theories  require  that  the  child  match  elements 
of  a  spoken  utterance  to  elements  of  the  event  representation.  It  is easy  to  see 
that  mastery  of  short  subpropositional  constituents  would  facilitate  this  matching 
for  multi-word  sentences;  it  is  worth  noting,  therefore,  that  there  is  plenty  of 
evidence  for  their  existence  in  children’s  early  word  combinations  (e.g.,  Braine, 
1976). 
There  are  a  number  of  places  in the  theory  where  different  semantic  analyses 
are  possible,  or  different  assumptions  about  the  relations  between  semantic 
structures  and  trees.  For  instance,  Macnamara  (1986)  suggests  that  distinctions 
within  the  logic  of  kinds  are  ancestral  to  various  noun  classes  (see  also  McPher- 
son,  1991,  on  the  count-mass  distinction).  I now  discuss  two  central  issues  of  this 
sort.  The  first  is the  source  of the  English  NP-VP  constituent  division;  the  second 
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ly,  all these  suggestions  involve,or  imply  proposals  about  the  language  of thought. 
The  NP-VP  constituent  split  in  English  and  many  languages 
The  earlier  discussion  concerning  Figures  3  and  4  concluded  that  the  multi- 
constituent  division  exemplified  in  Figure  3 does  not  provide  a  satisfactory  basis 
for  acquiring  the  NP-VP  structure  of English,  and  that  the  assumption  that  agents 
qua  subjects  are  universally  tree-structurally  privileged  (Pinker’s  method  of 
justifying  the  constituent  division  of  Figures  3 and  4)  is also  problematic.  What 
seems  to  be  needed  is  a  theory  in  which  a  child  would  be  obliged  to  make  an 
analysis  like  that  of  Figure  4 only  when  exposed  to  a  suitable  language  environ- 
ment  (like  English).  We  can  obtain  such  a  theory  by  adopting  the  following  two 
assumptions: 
(1) 
(2) 
A  multi-constituent  analysis  like  that  of  Figure  3  is  always  available  to 
children.  (By  “analysis  like  that  of Figure  3,”  I mean  an analysis  in which  the 
main  predicate  and  its arguments  each  has  a main  branch  (or  are  sisters  in the 
tree  structure).3  I  assume  that  the  branching  is unordered  in  the  language  of 
thought,  and  that  the  child  assigns  the  order  or  marking  found  in  the 
language  being  learned.) 
“Action”  is an ontological  category  of the  language  of thought.  (As evidence, 
Jackendoff,  1983,  pp.  49-5.5,  adduces  ‘that  we  make  reference  to  actions  and 
quantify  over  them.  For  instance,  the  expressions  do  it,  do  that always  refer 
to  actions;  in  Bill  did  the same  thing  Jack  did,  Biil  did  something  [everything] 
Jack  did,  the  thing  or  things  are  actions;  similarly,  the  answer  to  What did you 
do?  is an  action;  in  all  cases  the  action  goes  into  English  as  an  action  verb 
together  with  its  non-actor  arguments.) 
Note  that  if  “action”  is a  universally  available  category,  and  if  children  tend  to 
classify  words  and  phrases  as  referring  to  ontological  categories  (as  posited 
earlier),  then  phrases  indicating  actions  would  be  represented  as  constituents  if 
the  structure  of  the  language  lends  itself  to  that  representation.  The  structure  of 
the  language  will  lend  itself  to  that  representation  if  the  verb  and  its  non-actor 
arguments  habitually  occur  contiguously  in a continuous  string  -  then  they  can  be, 
and  (the  proposal  predicts)  will be,  labeled  as a unit.  In  a language  in which  they 
do  not  habitually  occur  contiguously,  then  a multi-constituent  analysis  like  that  of 
Figure  3 is made.  Thus,  in  a VSO  (verb-subject-object)  language,  or  a language 
with  a  very  free  word  order,  the  analysis  made  would  be  that  of  Figure  3. 
This  proposal  yields  many  of  the  same  consequences  as  Pinker’s  for  many 
‘1 do not mean to exclude  the  possibility  of  higher  nodes,  for  example,  with  elements  concerned 
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languages  (e.g.,  in  Pinker’s  theory,  VSO  languages  ultimately  end  up  with  tree 
structures  for  transitive  verb  sentences  that  have  the  same  multi-constituent 
branching  structure  as  Figure  3).  However,  there  is a significant  difference  in  that, 
according  to  this  proposal,  the  NP-VP  constituent  division  in  languages  like 
English  owes  nothing  to  any  innate  connection  among  agenthood,  subjecthood, 
and  being  an  argument  that  is  a  daughter  of  S.  Thus,  the  proposal  would  not 
cause  problems  in  accounting  for  the  acquisition  of  languages  where  these  are  not 
correlated  (or  where  there  is  little  evidence  for  subject  as  a  special  argument 
category  -  cf.  Comrie,  1989,  Ch.  5).  Similarly,  since  the  proposal  does  not  posit 
an  innate  tendency  for  subjects  of  adjective  and  locative  predications  to  be  put  in 
the  same  category  as  agents,  it  is consistent  with  evidence  that  children  distinguish 
these,  not  only  in  ergative  languages,  but  even  in  English  (Braine  &  Hardy, 
1982).  Moreover,  unlike  Pinker’s  theory,  the  proposal  can  accommodate  the 
characteristically  split  nature  of  ergative  systems  (Van  Valin,  1990,  1992):  children 
can  learn  the  extensions  of  semantic  roles  to  grammatical  relations  construction 
by  construction,  as  Pye  (1990)  argues  that  they  do. 
Other  treatments  of  some  of  the  language  variations  are  conceivable,  that  differ 
both  from  this  one  and  from  Pinker’s.  For  instance,  one  analysis  of  VSO 
languages  (e.g.,  Sproat,  1985)  holds  that  they  do  have  a  VP:  the  underlying 
constituent  order  is  I-S-(V-O)  (I  is  inflection);  then  the  V  moves  to  combine 
with  I  to  give  the  surface  VSO  order  (actually,  I +  V-S-O).  (Such  a  proposal 
might  be  neutral  on  the  question  whether  it  is  agency  itself,  or  the  unity  given  to 
the  VP  by  its  “action”  status,  that  makes  the  subject  into  a  VP-external 
argument.)  Proponents  have  not  yet  developed  the  implications  of  this  analysis 
for  language  acquisition.’  However,  in  so  far  as  it  supposes  that  all  languages 
underlyingly/innately  have  a  VP  constituent  that  excludes  the  subject,  it  would 
appear  to  have  rather  striking  implications  for  acquisition  that  are  testable. 
Presumably,  at  early  stages  prior  to  the  occurrence  of  productive  verb  inflections, 
one  should  observe  S-V-O  order  in  children’s  utterances-or  alternatively, 
perhaps,  subjects  would  be  systematically  omitted  (to  leave  the  VO  constituent). 
Then,  when  inflection  appears,  the  observed  surface  word  order  should  change  to 
the  adult  one  (or  the  absent  subjects  should  appear  in  postverbal  position).  It  will 
be  time  to  take  this  proposal  seriously  when  these  somewhat  counterintuitive 
predictions  have  been  found  to  be  fulfilled  (or  some  different  predictions  derived 
from  it).  Quite  recently,  Woolford  (1991)  has  argued,  for  at  least  a  few  VSO 
languages,  that  transitive  verb  subjects  are  generated  VP-internally  (i.e.,  that 
subject  and  object  NPs  are  sisters  of  the  verb);  she  has  also  shown  how  this 
analysis  might  be  extended  to  at  least  some  free-word-order  (“non- 
configurational”)  languages.  Such  analyses  are  consistent  with  my  proposal 
because  the  main  predicate  and  its  arguments  are  taken  as  sisters. 
4No  doubt  the  assumptions  underlying  this  approach  have  application  to  ergative  phenomena,  too, 
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Other  ways  of  rooting  the  NP  category? 
The  theory  presented  earlier  posited  that  the  original  semantic  basis  of  NP  is an 
argument  that  falls  into  the  ontological  category  of  object.  That  allowed  construc- 
tion  of  a theory  that  mimics  Pinker’s.  It may  well be  correct.  However,  there  is an 
important  issue  that  warrants  discussion  -  how  far  should  it  be  argumenthood  or 
objecthood  that  is taken  as the  initial  basis  of  NP?  The  great  majority  of  the  NPs 
of  very  young  children  do  undoubtedly  represent  objects;  however,  some  NPs 
that  represent  events  or  actions  can  also  appear  very  early,  for  example, 
utterances  like  more  that  or  see  that  where  that  refers  to  some  interesting  event. 
Such  utterances  do  not  disprove  the  analysis  -  they  could  merely  indicate  that  the 
old-rules-analyze-new-material  principle  operates  very  quickly  to  allow  object 
argument  expressions  to  refer  to  events.  However,  such  utterances  do  raise  the 
possibility  that  the  use  of  NPs  to  refer  to  events  might  turn  out  to  be  as primitive 
as  their  use  to  refer  to  objects;  that  would  not  be  consistent  with  the  theory 
considered  earlier  (either  in  Pinker’s  version  or  the  reformulation).  So  there  is 
reason  to  consider  the  possibility  of  alternative  analyses. 
In  Braine  (1987)  I presented  an analysis  that  made  little  use  of objecthood,  and 
rooted  the  NP  in  the  category  argument.  That  proposal  is  unsatisfactory  as  it 
stands  because  of  the  obvious  objection  that  there  are  other  kinds  of  phrases  that 
are  arguments.  For  example,  as noted  earlier,  some  prepositional  phrases  denote 
arguments,  notably  locative  phrases  like  on  the  bed  in  George  put  the  cat on  the 
bed.  Arguments  like  on  the bed  designate  places  or  paths;  they  are  formed  from  a 
preposition  and  an  NP,  and  have  a function-argument  form.  The  preposition  is a 
function  that  maps  an  object  argument  (the  bed)  into  a  place  argument  (on  the 
bed)  (Jackendoff,  1983);  the  NP  (the  bed)  is the  argument  of  the  function. 
Although  one  cannot  say,  simply,  that  arguments  are  characteristically  NPs, 
one  might  distinguish  basic  (i.e.,  underived)  arguments  from  derived  arguments 
(like  prepositional  phrases  designating  places).  One  might  then  claim  that  basic 
arguments  are  characteristically  NPs.  That  is,  characteristically,  arguments  of 
predicates  are  NPs,  or  built  from  functions  whose  ultimate  arguments  are  NPs.~ 
The  NP  would  be  catholic  from  the  start  in  the  ontological  categories  it  could 
represent,  whereas  arguments  built  from  functions  would  represent  particular 
ontological  categories  specific  to  the  function.  The  acquisition  theory  would 
continue  to  assume  that  children  are  sensitive  to  both  argumenthood  and  on- 
tological  category,  but  would  assign  somewhat  greater  weight  to  argumenthood 
than  the  theory  modeled  on  Pinker’s  that  was developed  earlier.  According  to  the 
argument  theory,  the  child’s  sensitivity  to  the  category  argument  makes  this  the 
root  of  NP  (i.e.,  NPs  would  be  argument-phrases).  When  derived  arguments  are 
encountered  (very  early  in  the  case  of  places),  the  argument  of  the  function  is 
‘One  needs  the  qualification  “characteristically”  because  there  are  some  individual  items  (e.g., 
here,  there)  which  are  presumably  not  NPs  although  they  may  designate  underived  arguments. 96  M.D.S.  Braine 
recognized,  as an NPIargument-phrase,  and  the  deriving  function  is identified  with 
the  ontological  category  of  the  derived  argument  (the  child  is still assumed  to  be 
sensitive  to  ontological  category). 
I  shall  not  develop  this  theory  further  because  I  know  of  no  current  evidence 
that  would  clearly  favor  it  over  the  theory  reviewed  earlier.  However,  it  seems 
important  to  note  that,  if adopted,  this  theory  would  place  constraints  on  possible 
semantic  analyses  in  linguistics,  namely,  that  they  do  not  contradict  the  generali- 
zation  that,  characteristically,  arguments  of  predicates  are  NPs  or  built  from 
functions  whose  ultimate  arguments  are  NPs.  For  instance,  predicate  adjectives 
could  not  be  analyzed  as property  arguments.  Thus,  a statement  like  The  man  is 
rich  would  have  to  be  analyzed  as  “RICH  (The  man)”  not  as  “BE  (The  man, 
Rich)“.  Similarly,  VPs  like  Paint  the  wall green  and  Make  the  man  rich  could  not 
be  analyzed  as “PAINT  (The  wall,  Green)”  and  “MAKE  (The  man,  Rich)“,  but 
would  have  to  be  analyzed  as “PAINT-GREEN  (The  wall)”  and  “MAKE-RICH 
(The  man)“,  with  PAINT-GREEN  and  MAKE-RICH  being  predicates  that  are 
compositionally  derived  by  a  function  that  maps  simple  predicates  into  complex 
ones  (e.g.,  MAKE  mapping  the  one-place  predicate  RICH  into  the  two-place 
predicate  MAKE-RICH).  I believe  that  there  is plenty  of independent  motivation 
for  the  complex-predicate  analysis  (cf.  Chomsky,  1975). 
Why  aren’t  semantic  categories  sufficient? 
One  might  wonder  why  syntactic  categories  emerge  at  all,  given  that  the  child 
starts  with  semantic  categories.  For  the  child  the  answer  is  simple-syntactic 
categories  emerge  because  languages  have  them;  that  is,  because  languages 
present  categories  whose  extensions  do not  match  those  of the  semantic  categories 
which  are  the  child’s  starting  point.  Since  the  language  has  such  categories  the 
child  has  no  option  but  to  acquire  them:  the  old-rules-analyze-new-material 
principle  provides  the  mechanism  which  adjusts  the  extensions  of  the  initial 
categories  (created  by  labeling  expressions  after  semantic  categories)  to  match  the 
extensions  of  the  categories  presented  by the  language.  (This  adjustment  is what  I 
mean  in  speaking  of  initial  semantic  categories  “growing”  into  the  syntactic 
categories  of  the  language  being  learned.) 
However,  one  can  shift  the  scope  of  the  question  from  the  child  learning  a 
language  to  language  in  general:  if  children  start  with  semantic  categories,  then 
why  do  languages  have  syntactic  categories  whose  extensions  do  not  match  those 
of  semantic  categories?  While  anything  like  a  full  answer  to  this  equation  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  a  brief  sketch  of  the  general  lines  of  a  possible 
answer  may  be  appropriate.  A  few  factors  may  be  critical. 
First,  plausible  semantic  categories  of  the  language  of  thought  often  seem  to 
have  fuzzy  boundaries;  for  example,  the  distinction  between  an  action  and  an Innate  structure  for  syntax  97 
experience  is  not  transparent  at  the  boundary,  nor  is  that  between  an  event  and  a 
state  of  affairs;  see  Schlesinger  (1979)  on  gradation  between  comitative  and 
instrumental.  The  consequence  is  that  where  languages  require  a  boundary  to  be 
drawn,  they  are  free  to  determine  its  placement,  and  nothing  forces  every 
language  to  locate  it  in  the  same  place. 
Second,  the  different  kinds  of  categories  typically  communicated  through 
grammar  tend  to  be  orthogonal  to  each  other,  and  semantic  relations  can  be 
similar  to  each  other  along  many  cross-cutting  dimensions.  Thus,  the  semantic 
roles  of  arguments  and  adjuncts  cut  across  ontological  categories;  similarly,  the 
pragmatic  roles  that  are  often  grammaticalized  -topic/comment  and  focus/ 
nonfocus  (or  new/given)(Comrie,  1989,  pp.  62-65)  -  cut  across  both  the  semantic 
roles  and  ontological  categories.  There  are  well-known  similarities  of  spatial 
relations  to  temporal  ones,  and  also  to  other  relations  like  possession;  spatial 
paths  can  be  seen  as  similar  to  temporal  and  informational  ones;  sources  and 
goals  can  be  locations  or  have  to  do  with  agency  or  purpose;  there  are  similarities 
among  transfer  relations,  whether  these  are  physical,  informational,  or  refer  to 
changes  in  possession  of  property  (Gruber,  1965;  Jackendoff.  1983).  Languages 
may  capitalize  on  these  similarities  in  different  ways  in  establishing  the  relations 
to  be  marked  in  the  grammar,  thus  installing  different  mappings  (including 
many-to-one  mappings)  from  semantic  to  syntactic  categories. 
Third,  learners  are  sensitive  to  phonological  similarities  among  words  (e.g., 
Brooks,  Braine,  Catalano,  Brody,  &  Sudhalter,  1991;  Karmiloff-Smith,  1978; 
Levy,  1983)  -  a  fact  that  makes  possible  the  acquisition  of  phonologically  marked 
categories  that  are  semantically  arbitrary,  like  many  noun  declensions  and  verb 
conjugations  (Braine.  1987;  MacWhinney,  1978). 
Finally,  the  oral-auditory  nature  of  language  means  that  a  spoken  sentence 
must  consist  of  a  linear  string  of  elements  occurring  one  after  the  other  in  time.  In 
most  languages  the  number  of  structurally  distinguishable  positions  is  quite 
limited.  For  example,  excluding  the  verb,  in  English,  one  can  distinguish  subject, 
object,  and  a  limited  number  of  preposition-marked  phrases.  Similarly,  in  inflec- 
ted  languages  the  number  of  different  noun  case  inflections  is  commonly  rather 
few  (e.g..  Latin  had  six).  Typically,  then,  the  number  of  available  surface- 
structure  positions  is  less  than  the  number  of  semantic  categories  that  can  exist  in 
the  semantic  representations  of  sentences.  In  that  case,  a  many-to-one  mapping 
from  semantic  structure  to  surface  position  is  forced. 
One  can  reasonably  ask  why  the  latter  situation  should  arise:  why  should  not  a 
language  have  as  many  prepositions  or  affixes  as  there  are  relational  meanings  to 
be  expressed?  The  most  likely  reason  is  that  limiting  the  number  of  surface  cues 
facilitates  learning  and  processing.  For  instance,  two  of  Slobin’s  (1973)  “operating 
principles”  were  that  new  meanings  tend  to  appear  first  expressed  by  familiar 
forms,  and  that  new  forms  tend  to  appear  first  expressing  familiar  meanings;  note 
that  both  these  principles  operate  to  destroy  rather  than  install  one-to-one Y8  M.D.S.  Bruine 
mappings  between  syntax  and  semantics  -  they  indicate  that  the  ease-of-learning 
benefit  from  acquiring  one  new  thing  rather  than  two  often  outweighs  the  benefit 
of  a  strictly  one-to-one  mapping  from  semantics  to  syntax. 
Other  factors  than  these  may  also  be  operative,  but  these  few  suggest  that  there 
are  a  number  of  processes  that  would  tend  to  cause  natural  languages  to  have 
syntactic  categories  whose  extensions  are  not  in  perfect  correspondence  with 
initial  categories  of  the  language  of  thought.  It  follows  that  for  the  adult 
language  -indeed  for  any  developmental  stage  after  the  very  initial  stage  - 
description  of  the  language  should  be  expected  to  require  separate  syntactic  and 
semantic  levels  of  representation.  Thus,  except  for  the  initial  stage,  a  semantic 
assimilation  acquisition  theory  is  quite  consistent  with  the  thesis  of  the  autonomy 
of  syntax,  although  it  does  not  mandate  it. 
Conclusion 
It  is  perfectly  feasible  to  have  an  acquisition  theory  that  starts  with  semantic 
structure  and  posits  no  innate  syntactic  structures.  Such  a  theory  has  important 
advantages.  First,  it  is at  least  as  plausible  and  more  economical  than  the  syntactic 
theory.  This  follows  evidently,  since  the  theory  sketched  in  the  main  section  of 
the  paper  (“Is  bootstrapping  necessary”)  is  essentially  Pinker’s  theory  with  the 
structure  of  the  language  of  thought  substituted  for  X-bar  theory.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  economy,  that  substitution  is  pure  gain  since  one  has  to  assume  anyway 
that  a  basic  semantic  structure  for  propositions  is present  at  the  outset  of  language 
acquisition  (and  that  is  assumed  by  Pinker),  and  the  substitution  has  the  addition- 
al  economy  of  eliminating  the  need  for  the  innate  semantic  flags  to  syntactic 
categories  that  Pinker  is  forced  to  postulate.  Another  advantage  is  that  such  a 
theory  provides  an  account  of  the  developmental  origin  of  natural  language 
syntactic  categories,  instead  of  postulating  them  as  primitives  whose  source  has  to 
be  explained  by  a  supplementary  biological  theory  of  a  kind  we  do  not  know  how 
to  construct. 
It  follows  from  this  conclusion  that  a full  theory  of  language  acquisition  requires 
understanding  of  the  semantic  roots  of  syntax,  including  especially  of  X-bar 
theory,  that  is,  of  the  semantic  roots  of  what  is  universal  or  near-universal  in 
phrase  structure.  Such  investigation  (exemplified,  for  instance,  in  Jackendoff, 
1983,  1990)  appears  to  be  one  of  the  few  routes  into  the  structure  of  the  language 
of  thought,  the  definition  of  which  should  surely  be  a  central  goal  of  cognitive 
science. 
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